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LITIGATION AND ACTIVISM:
THE BHOPAL CASE*
Michael R. Anderson"
The notion that law may be relied upon as a tool to produce rapid
and comprehensive social transformation in developing areas is giving
way to criticism from all sides. Experience has shown that plans for
legally-induced social revolutions are often frustrated at the level of
implementation, and that when social changes do comport with legally
enshrined objectives, they are largely attributable to non-legal causes.
New laws often have unintended effects that either neutralize desired
reforms or create entirely new problems for policy makers.
Even where the efficacy of legal reforms is unproblematic, policy
objectives are not. Does "development" primarily consist in expanded
aggregate production, the fulfillment of basic human needs, or a
measurable improvement in a basket of social indices? Despite the
brave pronouncement of the United Nations Development Programme
"Development Index,"' there is a paucity of consensus as to what
kinds of economic and political changes might constitute
"development." The limitations of socialist models - persistent
competitive disadvantage, a tendency to authoritarianism, and
individual choice strangulated by overzealous planning - were clear
even before the 1989 revolution discredited the legacy of 1917.
Capitalist models have fared somewhat better, but they have been
plagued by the consequences of the debt crisis, while even many
Americans are hesitant to recommend a model that seems wrecked on
the twin shoals of a morally bankrupt consumerism and a social crisis
comprising drugs, poverty, and crime. Industrialization, of either the
capitalist or the socialist variety, has been subject to growing
accusations of ecocide. Notions of sustainable development offer to
* The author would like to thank David Bergman, Barbara Dinham, and Satinath Sarangi for their
ideas and support in writing this paper.
Dept. of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, Thornhaugh St., London WC I H OXG.
1. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1990. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990, chap. i.
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curb the excesses of industrialization and ensure human dignity, but
it is not clear that they are able to provide the mechanism for
expanded production which will be necessary to meet basic human
needs on a global scale.
In the absence of clear goals and techniques for programmatic
development, recent proposals have emphasized the role of legal
institutions in empowering disadvantaged groups while holding
governments and corporations accountable for anti-humanitarian
activities. The new law of accountability has already met with some
considerable success - the innovative jurisprudence of public interest
litigation in India represents a significant advance, for example - and
is to be welcomed for its more realistic goals.
However, proposals and scholarship must proceed with caution if
the enthusiastic excesses of previous efforts are not to be replicated.
Where law presumes to "empower" the disadvantaged, a variety of
questions arise.2 Are new mechanisms of accountability actually
designed to translate social demands into effective policy? Is access
to a legal remedy genuinely widespread, or only available to particular
groups aided by legal and political professionals? Are legal categories
sufficiently sensitive to popular conceptions of justice, so that demotic
voices may find expression in legal form? Finally, are the
disadvantaged or injured parties active participants in the legal
process, or do they remain alienated, disempowered "victims" at the
mercy of an ambivalent altruism? That these questions are of urgent
analytical and practical significance becomes clear in the light of the
experience of litigation and activism following the Bhopal gas leak.
The case is a reminder that legal procedures place serious constraints
upon the possibilities for popular participation, and yet it usefully
demonstrates that political activism may be used to interrogate and
even breach those constraints.
2. The very notion of 'empowerment' houses a deep and pervasive ambiguity arising from its
inherent paternalism. Is power the kind of thing that can be simply bestowed, or must it be actively
seized? Who is empowered to empower, and what is their interest in doing so? On whose terms?
And for what ends?
LITIGATION AND ACTIVISM
Legal Marginalization
A graffito on the wall of the Union Carbide pesticide plant in
Bhopal declares: "Killer Carbide must be Punished." It is
emblematic of the frustration experienced by many people in Bhopal
following years of litigation.3 To local understandings, the injustice
seems obvious. The leak of methyl isocyanate gas on 3 December
1984 resulted in at least 2,800 immediate deaths, an undetermined
number of thousands of injuries and disabilities, and widespread loss
of livelihood. The simple fact that the leak occurred suggests that the
plant's safety features were inadequate, while ample evidence indicates
that the leak may be directly attributed to faulty plant design and
management errors. And yet, after over five years of litigation, the
patent injustice of the situation has failed to produce either a
determination of liability or any real compensation for the survivors.
Moreover, right from the outset, people in Bhopal have been
largely excluded from the litigation process. Their distance from the
putative mechanisms of accountability may be traced in four elements
of the litigation. First, the survivors of the leak are predominantly
Hindi-speaking, many are illiterate, and most have little previous
experience with litigation in India, much less with the American
lawyers who arrived to sign up claimants on contingency fee
arrangements in the first week following the disaster. Until early
1987, the litigation took place in U.S. courts - beyond the
participation or even observation of groups in Bhopal. The second
exclusion arrived in the form of the 1985 Bhopal Gas Disaster
(Processing of Claims) Ac by which the Central Government of
3. For reasons of brevity and clarity, details of the litigation have been omitted from this
account. For the basic documentation with commentary, see: U. Baxi & T. Paul, eds., Mass
Disasters and Multinational Liability: The Bhopal Case (Bombay: Tripathi, 1985); U. Baxi, ed.,
Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe: The Bhopal Case (Bombay: Tripathi, 1986); and
U. Baxi & A. Dhanda, eds., Valiant Victims and Lethal Litigation: The Bhopal Case (Bombay,
Tripathi, 1990). See also P.T. Muchlinski, "The Bhopal Case: Controlling Ultrahazardous
Industrial Activities Undertaken by Foreign Investors" 50 MODERN LAW REVIEW 545 (1987), and
M.R. Anderson, 'State Obligations in a Transnational Dispute: The Bhopal Case" in W.E. Butler,
ed., Control Over Compliance with International Law (London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
4. 25 International Legal Materials 884 (1986).
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India assumed a parens patriae role, arrogating to itself the exclusive
right to represent and act in place of every claimant in the Bhopal
litigation. Although Section 4 of the Act permits the claimant to retain
a legal practitioner at his or her own expense, it has left little room for
the participation of independent counsel. The formulation of the
complaints, the assessment of damages, and the decision to place a
higher priority on civil rather than criminal claims all originated in
government offices without consultation with people in Bhopal. Third,
Section 3(2)(b) of the Act also accorded to the Central Government the
power to enter into a compromise with Union Carbide. Between early
1985 and February 1989, the government intermittently conducted
negotiations with Carbide in the matter of an out of court settlement.
Again, representatives of Bhopal groups were neither present at the
negotiations nor consulted as to their content. The full effects of this
policy were felt on 14 February 1989, when Chief Justice Pathak
announced the results of a settlement that had clearly been reached in
negotiations between Carbide and the Government: $470 million to
settle all past present and future claims arising in relation to the
Bhopal case.5 Fourth, as Upendra Baxi has pointed out,6 the judicial
discourse has failed to recognize the real circumstances of people in
Bhopal who have been affected by the gas leak. What has emerged in
the language of both U.S. and Indian courts is the image of the
average "victim": shorn of age, gender, and life circumstances. The
"victim" has become a vague and polysemic symbol - imagined
according to the needs of the major actors in the litigation, but never
present in palpable form. Rhetorical representation has allowed the
government of India to gloss over the fact that, five years after the gas
leak, it has still not assembled a reliable and detailed account of how
many people have suffered particular types of injuries and disabilities.
It has allowed Union Carbide to blame the victims for being near the
5. UCC v. Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 674. The settlement was announced as a judicial
order, but there is little doubt that it was arrived at in negotiations between Carbide and the central
government of India. This was affirmed by the Union Carbide India Limited spokesperson, S.
Mitra: "Lawyers for both sides were there, and decided on $470 million.... This amount was
agreed by the lawyers and the Government of India. Then it was announced in Court. If you look
at the settlement you can tell this from the wording." (Personal Interview, 27 November 1989.)
6. Baxi, Valiant Victims, p. lxviii.
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site of the leak, and to impugn the veracity of their medical
testimonials. The abstracted "victim" is a conceptual fantasy, a
necessary by-product of a kind of litigation which excludes the
primary claimants. Thus, largely excluded by the formal legal
process, many survivors developed a sophisticated critique of legal
solutions of any kind, putting their trust in political activist groupings
to express their demands.
The Dialectic of Litigation and Activism
Immediately following the gas leak, a number of nongovernmental
organizations and activist groups were formed in Bhopal. In the
absence of adequate medical care and economic relief, the self-help
organizations in Bhopal have been the most effective vehicle for
coping with the medical, social, and economic effects of the gas leak.
They assumed a variety of forms, with diverse purposes and
approaches; moreover, as concerns and tactics changed, some groups
have declined while fresh initiatives were established. Overall, five
types7  of groups have been prevalent: apolitical relief and
rehabilitation groups, 8 groups that collected and disseminated
technical, legal, medical, and political information,9 trade union
organizations that mobilized support around workers'
issues, "international solidarity and support group,11  and the
explicitly political groups which have coordinated local relief,
organized political demonstrations, and actively participated in the
7. This typology draws upon S. Ravi Rajan, "Rehabilitiation and Voluntarism in Bhopal" 6
LOKAYAN BuLLETIN 3 (Jan.-April 1988).
8. The Self Employed Women's Association, the Mahila Chetna Manch, and the Lion's Club
are examples.
9. Including the Delhi Science Forum, the Medico-Friends Circle, the Lawyers Collective, and
the Bhopal Group for Information and Action.
10. The most active trade union is the Union Carbide Karamchari Sangh; non-union groups
include the Bombay-based Union Research Group, and the Gas Peedith Rahat Samiti.
11. The most active is the International Coalition for Justice in Bhopal, a network of groups
based in the U.S., U.K., Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands.
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litigation. 2 It is the last category which has been most important to
the trajectory of litigation.
Although largely peripheral to the actual process of litigation,
peoples' organizations in Bhopal have followed the litigation closely
and reacted in forms of social and political action. The categories and
objectives of the legal dispute have entered the vernacular in Bhopal,
so that the initial demands for justice have been channelled into more
legal forms. Litigation became closely involved with the timing,
agenda, and idiom of activism.
In turn, political activism has had some effect upon litigation.
The best example of this may be seen in the events following the
settlement of February 1989. Immediately following the
announcement of the settlement, groups in Bhopal exhibited several
reactions. Some accepted it, others rejected it outright, and still others
kept counsel in uncertainty. By April, a number of demonstrations
and speeches codified the emerging consensus that the settlement was
unacceptable on several counts: 1) first, that the quantum of relief
was deemed to be too low, 2) that the groups in Bhopal had found no
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process about the
nature of the settlement or its impending distribution, and finally, 3)
that Union Carbide had escaped the judicial process without ever
facing the question of its liability for the gas leak. A number of
groups filed both review and writ petitions seeking a reconsideration
of the judicially-announced settlement. While the $465 million
collected interest in a government bank account, the Supreme Court
failed to act on the petitions.
Meanwhile, political action denouncing the settlement continued
in Bhopal and New Delhi. The BGPMUS in particular opposed the
settlement with consistent and tireless campaigning. Immediately
following the announcement of the settlement, over 1,000 women from
Bhopal travelled to New Delhi where they sat in protest on the steps
12. Initially, the most active of these were the Nagrik Rahat Punarvas Samiti and the Zahreeli
Gas Kand Virodhi Morcha. The Morcha remains active, although has assumed a less prominent
profile. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan (BGPMUS) is a women's group founded
in September of 1986 which has been the most effective focus for political and legal agitation in
recent years. It receives support from the Delhi-based Bhopal Gas Peedit Sangharsh Sahyog Samiti
(BGPSss).
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of the Supreme Court. National and international media attention was
widespread, with statements of solidarity arriving from Dublin,
Amsterdam, London, and New York. As the protest gathered pace,
others registered their disapproval of the Court's action, including the
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, P.N. Bhagwati, who
condemned the settlement in an article prominently featured in the
influential magazine India Today. 3
Meanwhile, the women's group continued to rally around their
opposition to the settlement - using it as a way to voice their
grievances, but also as an emblem of their more quotidian struggle to
cope with the continuing effects of methyl isocyanate. Meeting every
Saturday in a park, 200-600 women would discuss the practical and
political matters involved in seeking medical relief, coping with
accelerating illness, securing work, and supporting the legal campaign
against the settlement. Their demonstrations kept the issue of the
settlement in the news while statements of solidarity from groups
around India (and from abroad) put pressure on both the Court and the
Government to take some form of action. Following the general
elections of November 1989, activists sensed a new window of
opportunity. The Rajiv Gandhi government had been replaced by a
coalition of parties less eager to woo foreign investment and more
inclined to sympathize with a populist politics. A process of quiet
lobbying began in Delhi. The effort was to persuade the new
government to provide immediate relief to people in Bhopal and
renounce the settlement of February 1989. In a letter sent to the new
Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, two of the groups demanded: 1) an
immediate hearing of the review petitions, 2) the withdrawal of the
criminal immunities granted in the February settlement, 3) an
announcement by the new government that the settlement was
"morally wrong," 4) full public disclosure of information relating the
Bhopal gas disaster and lifting the application of the Official Secrets
Act, and 5) that Union Carbide be banned from all operations in
India. 14 Then, on 22 December 1989, the Supreme Court handed
down a decision on three consolidated writ petitions regarding the
13. India Today (March 15, 1989), p. 45.
14. Cited in Baxi, Valiant Victims, pp. Ixii-ixiv.
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validity of the 1985 Act granting parens patriae power. The court
upheld the Act, but found that the government had a legal duty to
provide interim relief to the affected people of Bhopal until such time
as the litigation reached a conclusion. The quantity and nature of the
interim relief were left to executive discretion. The Court also noted
that the people of Bhopal would have an opportunity to make
representations to the Court in the hearings on the three review
petitions.
The lobbying efforts, supported by the Supreme Court decision,
paid rich dividends on 12 January 1990. The new Government
announced that 1) the quantum of settlement was insufficient to the
needs of people in Bhopal, 2) the affected people in Bhopal were
entitled to interim relief and that the amount and modality of relief
would be decided in consultation with the representatives of the
victims' groups, 3) that the claimants possessed inalienable rights to
a legal remedy which brought into question the conferring of criminal
immunities, and 4) that the Government supported the contentions of
the activist groups in the review petitions.
Long suspicious of government actions, the activist groups in
Bhopal had been able to turn the parens patriae power to their
advantage, using political pressure to realign the arguments before the
Court on the pending review petitions. In short, sustained activism
operating outside of the formal mechanisms of the law had a decisive
impact upon the course of litigation."3 What the events of 1989 and
1990 demonstrate is that where the mechanisms of tort law failed to
deliver effective forms of accountability for ultrahazardous activity,
the activist groups were able to mobilize political support, both
informally, and through parliamentary channels, to change the shape
of litigation.
Conceptualizing Justice
A further issue arises out of the interaction of litigation and
activism: the way in which justice is conceptualized. From the
15. At this writing, a Supreme Court decision on the review petitions was still awaited.
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outset, the premises of company law, tort law, and private
international law were called into question by activist groups in
Bhopal. Some activist leaders operated from positions informed by
Marxian or radical theory, others drew upon a populist anti-
corporatism, and still others tended toward an almost anarchical anti-
state and anti-industrialist position. A full description of these
positions, articulated over five years, is not possible here.
Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight several illustrative contrasts.
The notion of a corporation as a legal person has come under
considerable attack in Bhopal. While there have been consistent
demands to hold Union Carbide responsible for the gas leak, there has
been a parallel movement focusing not on the corporation, but on the
figure of Warren Anderson, the Chairman of Union Carbide at the
time of the leak. Repeated calls to try Anderson for murder are
partially rhetorical devices, but they are also partially efforts to
reconceptualize the legal situation. Whereas a corporation is by
definition not a natural person, and is therefore impossible to confront
in a personalized manner, Anderson is emblematic of the entire
corporate structure employing over 100,000 people. Also, by shifting
the idiom from one of civil responsibility to one of criminal
responsibility - embodied in a demotic understanding of murder -
groups in Bhopal are able to articulate strong demands in ways which
are more immediately accessible. The language of murder is able to
provide a strong reminder that people died, and continue to die, as a
result of the gas leak.
Second, many of the groups in Bhopal have questioned the notion
of monetary compensation. It is frequently pointed out that monetary
compensation is simply a way for Carbide to commodify human life
and incorporate that value into its account books, just like any other
cost of production. The BGPMUS has repeatedly emphasized that
monetary compensation is relatively low on their list of demands. An
influx of cash will simply raise the local price of goods, allowing
merchants to pocket most of the gains. Moreover, a payment may
place a full stop at the end of the litigational narrative, fostering the
illusion that with the payment of compensation, the legal system has
restored an equilibrium, and all future suffering has been accounted
for. In fact, the women point out, the medical and social effects of
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the gas are likely to continue for decades. What they demand in the
place of compensation is a four-part package: 1) full legal
determination of civil and especially criminal liability, 2) accessible,
low-cost medical care, 3) provision of employment schemes and
entrepreneurial opportunities to encourage local self-sufficiency, and
4) long-term monitoring of continuing medical effects.16
A question for further exploration, in Bhopal and elsewhere, is the
nature of the interaction of popular and official conceptions of justice.
The activist groups in Bhopal have clearly been influenced by legal
understandings of liability, and yet they have retained a certain
autonomy from those understandings and are able to provide a
sophisticated and compelling critique of many legal concepts.
Conclusion
It was almost inevitable that the Bhopal gas leak would give rise
to litigation, and that the litigation would be likely to carry on for
some years. Where the parameters of litigation have left little room
for the participation of people in Bhopal, it has actually marginalized
and silenced the very constituency that seeks a determination of
accountability. Activist groups have served to fill the accountability
gap in the Bhopal case and are likely to do so in similar circumstances
in the future. The biography of the Bhopal litigation reveals that
people's organizations can exert considerable influence at key points
in the litigation process. In their limited but significant peripheral
participation, such groups have adopted the language and agenda of
the legal system. The political consequences of this need to be
examined more closely. To some extent, legal concepts have surely
been empowering: they have provided specific objectives for protest
and a reconceptualization of popular demands. But in another way,
they may well be limiting. Where legal language describes the world
in a particular way, it places limitations on what types of action may
be imagined. If legal mechanisms are to offer authentic
determinations of accountability, they will need to accommodate the
16. This summary is derived primarily from interviews conducted in November 1989.
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participation of activist groups, as well as alternative conceptions of
justice offered up by such groups.

